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COMMENTS
EXCLUSION OF GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
FROMI INSURED'S GROSS ESTATE FOR
ESTATE TAX PURPOSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Group term life insurance,1 provided by an employer for the benefit of his
employees,2 is becoming an increasingly popular form of insurance, due, in
large part, to the favorable tax treatment afforded such policies. For example,
to a large extent, the premiums, paid and deductible by the employer3 are
not considered part of the employee's gross income.4 Another attractive feature
of group life policies is that each member of the group, including those 'who
might otherwise be uninsurable, may take advantage of the policy at low costs
to the employer or to both the employer and employee where there is joint con-
tribution. Group life insurance coverage is afforded to all the employees0 and,
1. Group term life insurance is protection covering a number of lives under a single
policy, the insured persons not being the contracting parties with respect to the group
policy. A situation where an employer takes out individual polides of life insurance on
the lives of his employees does not fall within the group term definition. The amount
of protection provided each employee under a gioup policy must be based upon some plan
which precludes the individual selection of such amounts. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1
(b) (1), 29 Fed. Reeg. 10517 (1964).
2. Group life insurance was made available for civilian officers and employees of the
federal government by the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, 6S
Stat. 736, 5 U.S.C. § 2091 (1964).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a); 2 Cum. Bull. SS (1920).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2) (1957). The 1964
amendments to the Code, however, provide that the cost of group term life inzurance
exceeding the face value of $50,000 paid by the employer constitutes grs income to
the employee. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 79. See generally Nagel, How the New Group-Term
Life Insurance Sections of the Internal Revenue Code Will Operate, 1964 In. LJ. 412.
5. Term insurance is not without its disadvantages, the most significant of which Stems
from the very basis of the policy-the employment contract. Frequently, a termination of
the employment contract and a termination of group coverage are mutually inclusive and
concurrent events. An option given the insured to convert his group coverage, upon
retirement, into permanent life insurance may afford an opportunity for coverage re-
gardless of the insured's physical condition. However, the premiums, no longer formulated
on a group basis but, rather, determined by reference to the actuarial tables, may prove
too great a financial burden. Allyn, Group Life Insurance: Development, Codification,
Trends and Use, 1953 Ins. L.J. 3S9, 392.
6. N.Y. Ins. Law § 204(1)(d)(1); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b) (1) (v) (b), 29
Fed. Reg. 10517 (1964).
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therefore, high-salaried executives,7 subject to high income tax rates, frequently
avail themselves of this comparatively low cost insurance.8
Under present law, the proceeds of ordinary life insurance are included in
the decedent's gross estate if the decedent possessed any "incidents of owner-
ship" in the policy immediately prior to his death.0 Although the term "in-
surance" is not defined by the Internal Revenue Code, group life insurance
is given the same treatment as other types of life insurance for estate tax
purposes.10 From the standpoint of the insured's family and dependents, it is
desirable that they receive the full insurance proceeds, undiminished by the
federal estate tax."
II. THE POLICY
The typical group plan involves renewable term insurance12 which terminates
with the insured's employment. 13 A master policy is issued to the employer,
which does not require medical examination of the employees and which may
preclude individual selection. 14 The master policy constitutes the contract of
insurance between the employer and the insurer, with a certificate being issued
to the employee as evidence of that insurance coverage.' The employer may
pay the entire premium, although it is common for the employee to contribute. 10
7. "The policy may provide that the term 'employees' shall include the officers, managers,
employees and retired employees of the policyholder . . . . The policy may provide
that the term 'employees' shall include the individual proprietor or partners if the employer
is an individual proprietor or a partnership." N.Y. Ins. Law § 204(1) (a). A provision
to this effect is not uncommon in state insurance law. E.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 4101(A)(1)
(1961); Wash. Rev. Code § 48.24.020(1) (1951).
8. For the device of an owner-executive receiving virtually all the coverage under a
group policy with just enough employee coverage to meet the underwriting requirements,
see Friedman & Bakst, Synthetic Group Life Insurance: New Opinion May Be the End
of a Gimmick, 12 J. Taxation 172 (1960).
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042; 26 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(1) (1961). Among the
incidents of ownership in an insurance policy, whether it is group life or otherwise, are the
insured's: right to the economic benefits of the policy; power to change the beneficiary;
power to surrender or cancel the policy; or power to pledge or assign the policy. See
notes 27-29 infra and accompanying text.
10. 1 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. gi 1650.05 (1962); see M. W. Dobrzensky, 34
B.T.A. 305 (1936).
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
12. For a discussion of the word "term," see notes 97 & 103 infra and accompanying
text. Due to the considerably higher premium cost of group permanent insurance, employers
usually prefer term insurance. A disadvantage of group permanent insurance to the
employee is that the premiums which the employer pays constitute a part of the covered
employee's taxable income. Lefevre, Use of Life Insurance in Business and Employment
Relationships, N.Y.U. 22d Inst. on Fed. Tax 1281, 1285-86 (1964).
13. 1 Couch, Insurance § 1:54 (2d ed. 1959).
14. 1 Richards, Insurance § 15 (Freedman 5th ed. 1952). In New York, such preclusion
is required by statute. N.Y. Ins. Law § 204(1) (a).
15. E.g., Crawford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 167 S.W.2d 915, 924 (Mo. Ct. App.
1943); 1 Richards, Insurance § 15 (Freedman 5th ed. 1952).
16. N.Y. Ins. Law § 204(1) (a) provides that the premiums may be paid "either wholly
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The group life policy is similar to other life insurance policies in that the in-
sured may have the power to change the beneficiary-, and to elect optional
modes of settlement without the consent of the beneficiary.1I The distinctive
feature of the group policy is the provision giving to the employee the right,
under certain circumstances, to convert the policy into individual life insur-
ance.
19
III. INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP
The 1942 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 193920 provided
that proceeds of life insurance were includible in the insured's gross estate
if either: (a) the decedent had paid, directly or indirectly, the premiums for
the policy; or (b) the decedent possessed any incidents of ownership at the
time of his death, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with anotherY'
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 altered the test for includibility of such
proceeds which were payable to the beneficiaries other than the decedents
estate,- by abolishing the "payment of premiums" test.2 3 Thus, today, life
insurance proceeds are includible in the decedent's gross estate only'" if he
from the employer's funds or funds contributed by him or from funds contributed jointly
by the employer and employees." Several states have adopted similar provisions. E~g., Iov;a
Code § 509.1(1)(b) (1962); Tex. Ins. Code art. 3.50(1)(b) (1952).
17. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra.
IS. See generally Sears, What Every Lawyer Should Know About-Life Insurance
Optional Modes of Settlement, 42 IIl. B.J. 284 (1954).
19. See notes 45-56 infra and accompanying text.
20. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided for the inclusion in the insured's
gross estate of proceeds of life insurance "receivable by the executor ... and ... receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his
own life." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122. Some uncertainty arose
concerning the definition of "policies taken out by decedent upon his own life." Twvo tests
evolved: "incidents of ownership" and "payment of premiums." 4 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal
Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 61.04(2) (1958). At different times, the courts applied
either or both of these tests, thus further confusing the issue. Ibid.
21. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 944; see 4 Rabldn & Johnson, op. at.
supra note 20, § 61.04(3).
22. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042 provides, in part:
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) Receivable by the executor.
"To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under polides on the
life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.
"To the extent of the amount receivable by all other bendiciaries as insurance under
policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent pose-ed at his
death any of the incidents of ov.mership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction ,ith
any other person."
23. The test was abolished for decedents dying after August 16, 1954. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 2042. But see note 113 infra and accompanying text.
24. Proceeds of life insurance which are not includible in the gross estate under
§ 2042 may be included, however, depending upon the facts, under § 2035. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 20.2042-1(a)(2) (1961).
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possessed any incidents of ownership which he could exercise either alone or
with another, 25 immediately prior to his death.2 0
The Treasury Regulations attempt to give an illustrative, rather than ex-
haustive, list of these incidents:
[T]he term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of
the policy in the technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference
to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. Thus,
it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to
obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc.2 7
The courts are in general agreement with the Regulations. It has been held
that the determination of whether a decedent possessed any incidents of
ownership and the interpretation of such incidents is one of fact.28 As a re-
sult, recurring fact patterns have given the courts sufficient opportunity to
rule on the examples contained in the Regulations.2 9 As will be seen,80 group
term life insurance policies contain several incidents of ownership,8 ' the
presence of any of which would result in making the proceeds payable there-
under includible in the decedent's taxable estate.
25. Although only a few cases have dealt with the phrase "in conjunction with any
other person," the interpretation that they have imposed is indeed a liberal one. Thus,
a mere power in the decedent, in his capacity as trustee or otherwise, to veto changes to
be effected by others, has been held within the section. 2 Mertens, Federal Gift and
Estate Taxation § 17.15 (1959); see Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d
197 (2d Cir. 1956); Estate of Goldstein v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 264, 122 F. Supp.
677 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
26. "[A]lthough the insured must possess incidents of ownership at his death, he need
not have retained or reserved these incidents in connection with any transfer of the
insurance or designation of a beneficiary thereunder . . . ." Lowndes & Kramer, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes 295-96 (1956). (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis omitted.)
27. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1961). The term "incidents of ownership" also in-
cludes a reversionary interest arising out of operation of law or the express term of the
insurance contract which is in excess of 5% of the value of the policy. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1
(c) (3) (1961).
28. Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d
150 (3d Cir. 1953).
29. The following incidents of ownership have been ruled on:
(a) The power to change primary beneficiary. Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373
(7th Cir. 1957) ; Helvering v. Reybine, 83 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1936).
(b) The power to change contingent beneficiary. Broderick v. Keefe, 112 F.2d 293
(1st Cir.), appeal dismissed mem., 311 U.S. 721 (1940).
(c) The power to surrender and cancel the policy. Bessie M. Ballinger, 23 B.T.A. 1312
(1931); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 335 (1929) (dictum). But see
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 40 B.T.A. 268 (1939). See also Commissioner v.
Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
30. See notes 34-83 infra and accompanying text.
31. For the insured to retain the incidents of ownership, it is not necessary that he
retain possession of the policy. Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (Wi). Pa. 1952), aff'd
per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
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The subject of assignment of group life insurance for federal estate tax
purposes is comparatively new. Respecting individual coverage, the most com-
mon means by which the insured may divest himself of the incidents of owner-
ship is by absolute assignment.32 However, it has not yet been determined
whether the Internal Revenue Service will recognize that an employee may,
by assignment, completely divest himself of all his interest in the group coverage,
so as to satisfy the statutory requirement33 that he possess no incidents of
ownership in the policy at the time of his death.
IV. DInESTMNT or INcDENTS OF OWNERSHIP BY AssxoN IxrT
In general, an insurance policy is an assignable chose in action,24 the
assignment of which is not contrary to public policy. 3 However, both the
master policy as well as the certificate invariably contain a provision prohibit-
ing assignment.30 Although a provision of this nature is not a legal requisite
to a valid policy, and may be eliminated, the employer may be unwilling to
delete the provision from all the policies since this would defeat many of the
advantages of group coverage, especially the inducement of continuing em-
ployment. Since the prohibition is beneficial to the employer, his consent may
be required to vitiate the effectiveness of the prohibition3 7 Furthermore, since
it has been stated that limitations on assignment are for the benefit of the
insurer,30 such limitations may also have to be waived by iLP It has been
suggested 4° that a procedure whereby the employer, employee, and insurer enter
32. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(1) (1961).
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
34. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); St. John v. American Mlut. Life Ins. Co.,
13 N.Y. 31 (1855); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1310 (1953).
35. Senese v. Senese, 121 N.Y.S.2d 493, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (dictum).
36. See Vance, Insurance § 203, at 1039 (3d ed. 1951).
37. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 453, 47 A.2d 340, 342
(Ct. Err. & App. 1946). In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brownr, 222 Ky. 211, 213-14, 30
S.W. 599, 600 (1927), the court stated: "The chief reason the coal company [employer] had
for effecting and keeping paid the cost of this insurance for its employees was that they
might thereby be induced to continue in its service. Such tendency as the insurance had to
that end would be destroyed completely by the assignment of the policy and its benefits.'
38. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson Banking Co., 223 Ala. 13, 134 So. 25
(1931) (dictum); accord, Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 2S4, 290, 51 So. 2d 13, 18 (1950)
(dictum); Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Ulery, 149 So. 2d 370, 373 (Fla. CL App. 1963) (dictum).
39. See Oleska v. Kotur, 113 Ind. App. 423, 43 N.E2d SS (1943); McNamea v. Griffin,
137 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (Sup. CL 1954), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 23S5 App. Div.
386, 137 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 309 N.Y. S64, 131 N.E.2d 2,G,4 (1955).
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Poliakoff, 123 N.J. Eq. 524, 523, 193 At]. 852, 353
(Ch. 1938) (group life policy), the court stated: "If an assignment under the drcumstances
of the case vwil not interfere with fulfillment of the parties' intention, the prohibition will
be disregarded." Accord, Chelsea-Wheeler Coal Co. v. Mlarvin, 132 NJ. Eq. 462, 23 A2d
505 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942), revd on other grounds after retrial, 134 N.J. Eq. 432, 35 A.2d
874 (CL Err. & App. 1944); Hasselberger v. Hasselberger, 102 N.YS2d 520 (Sup. CL 1951).
40. McCarthy, Personal Life Insurance: Transfers of Ownership of Life Policies; Appli-
cation of Federal Tax Liens to Life Insurance, N.Y.U. 13th Inst. on Fed. Tax 436, 439
(1960).
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into an agreement retaining the prohibition in the master policy, but waiving
it for specific employees, 41 would have the desired result of circumventing
the assignment prohibition.
Assuming that the problem of the assignment prohibition has been success-
fully bypassed, the question remains whether, despite its unique features, a
group policy can be assigned so as to completely divest the insured of every
incident of ownership.
A. Power To Change the Beneficiary
The right to designate the beneficiary of a group policy is conferred by
the policy itself, as required by state law.42 Although the power to change
the beneficiary is not required by state law, it is, almost universally, con-
ferred by the policy. This power to change the beneficiary is specifically desig-
nated in the Regulations as an incident of ownership.43 That the insured, by
an unconditional assignment of the policy, can satisfactorily divest himself
of this incident of ownership is uncontested.
44
B. Conversion Privilege
Virtually all group life insurance policies contain a provision giving the
employee the right to convert the policy into individual life insurance without
41. The problem of excluding group life insurance proceeds from the gross estate has
not been of troublesome nature to the employee who has only $5,000 group coverage. (The
average size group policy as of 1963 was $4,490. McNeill, Excess Group Life, Split-Dollar
or Deferred Compensation?, 19 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 255, 256 (1965).) Congress, in declaring
a $60,000 exemption in determining the taxable estate, has alleviated the necessity of
assigning what would otherwise be the taxable property of low and middle income em-
ployees. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2052. This congressional grace, however, does not
solve the $100,000-a-year executive's dilemma of salvaging, for his surviving spouse and
family, as much of his liquid assets as possible. It is submitted that, in order to satisfy
the requirements of all parties concerned, the following plan may be considered:
(a) On group policies of $20,000 or less, there should be an absolute prohibition of
assignment;
(b) On policies over that amount, there should be an anti-assignment clause with
provision for waiver where the assignment would be to the insured's immediate family or
in his best interest. In negative terms, "best interest" of the employee would include the
denial of the waiver when the assignment would be for the purpose of creditors, as
security for a loan or for reasons other than the security of the employee's family,
42. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72-6-2(6) (1953); N.Y. Ins. Law § 161(1)(d);
Wash. Rev. Code § 48.25.150 (1951).
43. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
44. In Anna Rosenstock, 41 B.T.A. 635, 637 (1940), the court stated: "By such uncondi-
tional assignment the insured was divested of all legal interest in those policies. Also, by
such act, insured's right, reserved in the policies, to change the beneficiary was abrogated.
Jacobs v. Strumwasser, 145 N.Y.S. 916."
It should be noted that some doubt has been raised as to whether an irrevocable designa-
tion of a beneficiary would effectually extinguish that incident of ownership for more than




evidence of insurability, upon termination either of his employment15 or of
the policy. 6 There appears to be no reason to presume that this conversion
privilege is "personal" to the insured and, hence, inalienable. Unfortunately,
however, the rationale of several decisions has been employed by some au-
thorities to suggest the contrary.4
In Fearon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,40 the insured's brother was named
beneficiary. The group policy contained a conversion option which was ex-
ercisable within a thirty-one day period. The insured died after terminating
his employment, but prior to the expiration of the option period.5" His brother,
the beneficiary, made a futile attempt to exercise the option-before the ex-
piration of this period-by obtaining a policy on the life of his dead brother '
The court refused to allow the exercise of the conversion privilege, and held
that the insurance company was only under an obligation to issue a new policy
if the person upon whose life the policy was to be issued was alive at the time
45. 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 125 (1941). The New York Insurance
Law provides that no policy of group life insurance can be issued without "a proision
to the effect that in case of the termination, for any reason whatsoever, of the employ-
ment of any employee while insured under a group policy issued to his employer... such
employee . .. -hall be entitled to have issued to him by the insurer, without evidence of
insurability, upon application made to the insurer vithin thirty-one days after such
termination . .. a policy of life insurance only . . . in an amount equal to the amount
of his protection under such group insurance policy at the time of such termination ... !'
N.Y. Ins. Law § 161(1)(e). See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72-6-2(3) (1953); Pa.
Stat Ann. tit. 40, § 532.6(3) (1954); Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-428.1 (Supp. 194).
It is further provided that, "in the event a group life insurance policy . . . permits a
certificate-holder to convert to another type of life insurance within a specified time after
the happening of an event, such certificate-holder shall be notified of such privilege and
its duration within fifteen days after the happening of the event . . . . N.Y. Ins. Law §
204(3). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1269 (1956); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 532.7 (1954).
46. N.Y. Ins. Law § 161(1)(f) provides that, if the insurer or employer cancels the
policy, all employees who have been covered under such policy for a minimum of five
years shall be entitled to a life insurance policy not to exceed q2,C00. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 20-1267 (1956); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72-6-2(9) (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 40, § 532.6(9) (1954); Va. Code Ann. § 33.1-423.2 (Supp. 1964).
47. Because the conversion privilege is exercisable only upon the termination of em-
ployment or the cancellation of the policy by the employer, it could be clasAfied as a
future interest. It has been held that future interests are freely assgnable. Eg., Clowe v.
Seavey, 203 N.Y. 496, 102 N.E. 521 (1913); In the Matter of Mrs. & Traders Trust Co.,
270 App. Div. 322, 59 N.Y.S.2d 519 (4th Dep't 1946); In the Matter of Estate of Heye,
149 I sc. S90, 269 N.Y. Supp. 530 (Surr. Ct. 1933), affd mem., 241 App. Div. 907, 271
N.Y. Supp. 1042 (4th Dep't 1934).
43. McCarthy, supra note 40, at 439-40; see Yohlin, New Tax Opportunities and Pitfalls
in Assignments of Life and Group Insurance Benefits, 13 3. Taxation 120 (19L0). "[T]he
privilege of conversion must be affirmnatively exercised by the certificate holder himself,
in the absence of a statutory rule to the contrary." 1 Richards, Insurance, § 15, at 57
(Freedman 5th ed. 1952). See N.Y. Ins. Law § 161(e).
49. 138 Misc. 710, 246 N.Y. Supp. 701 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1930).
50. Id. at 711, 246 N.Y. Supp. at 702-03.
51. Id. at 711-12, 246 N.Y. Supp. at 703-04.
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the conversion privilege was attempted to be exercised. 2 And, in Young v.
General Am. Life Ins. Co.,5 3 where it was held that the beneficiary could not
exercise the right of conversion after the insured employee's death, the court
stated:
The decedent in the instant case failed to exercise the privilege for a conversion. The
pertinent question now presented is whether or not the beneficiary had such right
after the death of her husband. We are forced to the conclusion, upon principle as
well as upon decided cases, that the beneficiary would have no such right. The very
language of the policy relative to conversion demands affirmative action on the
part of employee whose employment is discontinued.5 4
The language of the court in the Young case would seem to be the stronger
authority of the two cases for concluding that the conversion privilege is per-
sonal to the employee and, hence, unassignable. The ruling of that court,
however, is not on point despite the language used in dictum. It should be
particularly noticed that, at the time of the insured's death, no other party
had the right to exercise the conversion privilege. The policy had conferred
the right on the insured employee, and no assignment or transfer of that right
had been attempted. Hence, the effectiveness of such an attempt was not
ruled upon. Furthermore, in both cases the attempted exercise of the conver-
sion privilege by the beneficiary did not occur until after the death of the
insured. Thus, their applicability, even by analogy, is at best tenuous.
It has been suggested that the requirement that group life insurance policies
contain a conversion privilege55 evidences a legislative intent that the privilege
be one of which the insured cannot be divested. 0 However, it would seem that
the purpose of this requirement is only to protect the insured by guaranteeing
continued insurability. Therefore, assignment of this privilege would not be
tantamount to a waiver since the conversion privilege could still be exer-
cised by the assignee. As a result, there is no good reason why an assignment
of the conversion privilege should not be effective to divest the insured em-
ployee of this incident of ownership.
C. Power To Cancel by Terminating Employment
In the Regulations, the power to "surrender or cancel the policy" is spe-
cifically designated as an incident of ownership.5 7 May it be said that the
52. Id. at 712, 246 N.Y. Supp. at 704.
53. 35 Ohio L. Abs. 464, 41 N.E.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1941). In Crutchfield v. Continental
Assur. Co., 336 Ill. App. 411, 84 N.E.2d 333 (1949), the conversion privilege was again
held to be coterminous with the life of the employee insured, despite the fact that, at the
time the group insurance policy expired, the insured was totally incapacitated.
54. Young v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., supra note 53, at 467, 41 N.E.2d at 897. (Em-
phasis added.)
55. The laws of some 37 states require a similar conversion privilege. E.g., Cal. Ins.
Code § 10209(b); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 73, § 843(d) (1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 532.6
(1954); Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-428.1 (Supp. 1964); Wash. Rev. Code § 48.24.180 (1951).
56. Taft, Group Life Proceeds--A Taxing Problem, 9 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 324, 330
(1955).
57. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1961).
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cancellation of the group policy through the exercise of the power to terminate
employment is an incident of ownership? The Regulations state that "the
term [incidents of ownership] has reference to the right of the insured or his
estate to the economic benefits of the policy."38 Since no cash surrender value
attaches to a group term policy, neither the insured nor his estate would re-
ceive any economic benefit as a result of cancellation. The problem, however,
may not be as simple as that.
In Commissioner v. Treganowan,59 the insured's executor excluded 20,000
dollars from the gross estate. The deceased had been a member of the New
York Stock Exchange, the constitution of which established a "Gratuity Fund"
providing for the payment of 20,000 dollars by the surviving members to the
families of the deceased members. No member had the right to name, select
or designate any beneficiary other than the members of his family as prescribed
by the constitution, nor could the proceeds be assigned or pledged for the
payment of a debt. ° The court held that, even though the deceased did not
have the normal incidents of ownership, "an Exchange member does have the
power to sell his seat, thus divesting his beneficiary of any right to payments,
and entitling the purchaser to the same insurance which the seller has had.'01
It appears from the language used by the court that the cancellation of the
policy by termination of employment was not the incident of ownership.
Rather, the fact that the cancellation would result in divesting the beneficiary
of the right to payment was the incident of ownership. In the case of an as-
signed group policy, cancellation by termination of employment will not divest
the beneficiary of his right to payment. Although the specific group policy
will be cancelled, the rights of the beneficiary will not be affected by that
cancellation since apparently the assignee can exercise the conversion privilege.
Hence, insurance coverage will be discontinued and the beneficiary will be
divested of his right to payment only if the assignee elects not to exercise
this privilege. 2
Furthermore, the incidents of ownership, as enumerated in the Regulations,
relate to the proceeds in one of two ways: either in the amount that will be
distributed, or in the scheme of that distribution0 3 For example, a change in
beneficiary will affect the scheme of distribution, whereas a pledge or loan
may affect the amount of proceeds ultimately distributed.0 4 However, the
cancellation of the group policy by employment termination could not result
in a disbursement change where the assignee exercises the conversion privilege,
58. Ibid.
59. 183 F.2d 2SS (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
60. 183 F.2d at 2S9.
61. Id. at 292.
62. Where the assignee is not the beneficiary, the rights of the beneficiary vill again
not be affected directly by the assignor's action. The beneficiary will be divested of his
right to payment only if the assignee elects not to convert or if he changes the beneficiary.
63. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
64. Under a pledge agreement, the pledgee would require that he would be made a
beneficiary up to the amount of the loan, thus temporarily divesting the original beneficiary
of at least a portion of the expected proceeds. If the pledgor fails to repay the loan, how-
ever, there would be a permanent divestment.
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and, even where this privilege is not exercised, it is not the scheme of dis-
tribution which is affected but, rather, the very fact of distribution. Affecting
the very fact of distribution will be an incident of ownership, in the case of the
cancellation of an individual policy, because in a sense there is an effect upon
the scheme of distribution. The insured will receive the cash surrender value
of the policy. However, when an employee cancels his group coverage by
terminating employment, there is no cash surrender value.05
Finally, the dual inclusion clauses of section 2042 provide that the proceeds
will be included in the decedent's gross estate if they are receivable by his
executor, or if they were receivable by a beneficiary but were subject to the
exercise of an incident of ownership retained by the decedent. 0 It would
appear that the underlying rationale was to render taxable all proceeds which
were in fact paid or payable to the estate, or which the insured had the power
to make payable to his estate or to himself through the exercise of an incident
of ownership. Neither result, however, is possible with respect to the proceeds
of an assigned group policy. Even if the employee were to terminate his em-
ployment after the assignment, he would not have the power to direct the
payment of the proceeds to himself or his estate, nor would he himself have
the power to direct the proceeds away from the designated beneficiary.
Dictum in Estate of John C. Whitworth0 7 would appear to support this view.
There, it appeared that the decedent had made an inter vivos transfer of the
proceeds of a pension plan. According to the employment contract, "no
termination of the employment agreement, by any means whatsoever, would
affect [decedent's] . . .rights under the company's pension plan . . . ."I The
Commissioner, in attempting to include the proceeds in the decedent's estate,
contended that the decedent had the power to breach the employment con-
tract and thereby terminate any rights thereunder which had been trans-
ferred to his wife.69 The court held that the proceeds were not includible
in the estate because of the very terms of the agreement. 70 In dictum, how-
ever, the court also stated that the termination of employment was not to be
deemed a power of revocation:
To follow respondent's [Commissioner's] reasoning leads to an absurd result
not required or permitted in the construction of a statute. To do so would be
tantamount to holding that the value of all rights of widows to pension benefits
arising under their husbands' employment contracts must be included in their
deceased husbands' estates. All employees are able to cease their employment since
the abolition of slavery . . . .Indeed, were decision to turn upon the latter point
[cessation of employment being a sufficient power of revocation so as to include
the proceeds in the gross estate], the value of no widow's right to pension arising
65. Group life insurance policies usually contain a clause stating that the policy has no
loan or cash value. 29 N.Y. Jur. Insurance § 521, at 513 (1963).
66. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
67. 22 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 177 (1963).
68. Id. at 178.
69. Id. at 180-81.
70. Id. at 181.
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under a. . . contract . .. wherein her husband was a party could escape inclusion
in the deceased husband's estate.7
D. Power To Cancel by Discontinuing Premiums
An insured under a policy of contributory group insurance may exercise
his power to "surrender or cancel" by defaulting in the periodic premium
payments while remaining employed. If the insured has assigned the policy,
the assignee would not have the right to exercise the conversion privilege since
the privilege is exercisable only when the employee terminates his employ-
ment,72 or when the employer terminates the group policy. 3 The assignee,
however, will quite naturally seek to fortify his waning beneficial interest
by attempting to tender the premium payments himself, in spite of the em-
ployee's seemingly contrary intentions. But the tender of these payments, to
be effective, must be accepted by the employer. In view of the action of his
employee, and in light of the increased cost and effort necessarily expended
in receiving and transmitting premium payments from non-employees to the
insurer, the employer would tend to discourage such arrangements. In any
event, it appears doubtful that the assignee would be capable of compelling
acceptance of the premiums by either the employer or the insurer.74 There-
fore, it would seem that the insured in a contributory plan, even though he
had assigned the policy, could exercise such control over the policy so as to force
a cancellation of the policy. This could be used by the assignor as a device to
terminate or render worthless what would otherwise be an absolute assign-
ment, and the power thus construed would constitute an incident of owner-
ship 7 5
In an attempt to remove this stumbling block, an absolute assignment form,
which would be signed by the employee, employer, and insurance company,
should contain a clause that both the insurer and employer agree to accept
tender, from the assignee, of any and all requisite contributions to maintain
the insurance under the group policy.
As a result, the insured employee could not affect the rights of the assignee
by failing to contribute to the plan since the assignee himself could tender
payments to the insurer, which would have to be accepted.
71. Id. at 131 (dictum).
72. N.Y. Ins. Law § 161(e).
73. As has been noted previously, the conversion privilege is exercisable only when
the master policy is cancelled or where there is a cessation of employment. N.Y. Ins. Law
§ 161(f).
74. In Iagee v. Equitable Life Atsur. Soc'y of the United States, 62 N.D. 614, 622,
244 N.W. 518, 521 (1932), the court noted that the insurer was not obligated to notify
the employee that no further premiums were paid for him by the employer, because the
employee could not pay the premiums himself. See Davis v. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 161
Tenn. 655, 32 S.WX.2d 1034 (1930).
75. It may be said, however, that discontinuing premium payments is not an incident
of ownership because the economic benefits could not be rendered payable, nor were they





The only example given by the Code of an incident of ownership is a
reversionary interest: "[T]he term 'reversionary interest' includes a possibility
that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or
his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him."70 Such an
incident of ownership may arise either from the express terms of the policy,
from an assignment, or by operation of law.77 The Code also provides that
the proceeds will only be includible in the gross estate "if the value of such
reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately
before the death of the decedent."7 8 The possibility of reversion is valued by
the use of mortality tables and actuarial principles 0 and, if the potential
reversion is to take effect after an estate for life, the value varies directly with
the age of the transferee at the time of the transfer.80 The decedent's estate
will, therefore, include, for estate tax purposes, the entire proceeds of the
policy regardless of whether these proceeds were in fact a part of his estate.81
There does not seem to be any doubt that the deceased will be said to have
had a reversionary interest if the assignment or policy contains a provision
that the proceeds will be payable to the insured's estate if the beneficiary
predeceases him. 8 2 However, where there is a sufficient number of family
members, the five-per-cent rule can be eliminated by sheer numbers. If there
76. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042(2).
77. A reversion by operation of law results only from an incomplete vesting, as, for
example, where the contingent interest of a beneficiary fails to become a vested one. A
transfer of a reversionary interest, whether this interest has its roots in the policy or In
an operation of law, will be taxable unless excepted by the five-per-cent rule. Dicus, Some
Implications of the 1954 Code for Estate Planning, 32 Taxes 938, 939 (1954).
78. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042(2).
79. Ibid. For example, assume that the decedent assigned a $50,000 individual policy to
his wife, but retained a possibility of reverter in favor of his estate if she should predecease
him. At the date of the decedent's death, his wife was forty-eight years old and the cash
surrender value of the policy was $37,500. (In determining the amount of the reversionary
interest, the face amount of the policy is not relevant, but rather the value of the policy
immediately before the insured's death, i.e., the cash surrender value. Bank of New York v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).) The value of the reversion would
be $17,138.63, almost 46% of the cash surrender value. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(d),(f)
(1961).
80. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(d) (1961). If there is only one transferee, the lowest value
of the reversionary interest would be 12.838%. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(d), (f) (1961). There-
fore, successive life estates would have to be created to circumvent the five-per-cent rule.
The value of the reversionary interest when there are successive life estates is computed on
the basis of the Makehamized mortality table which appears as Table 38 of the United States
Life Tables and Actuarial Tables 1939-41, published by the United States Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Census. 26 C.F.R. 20.2031-7(e) (1961).
81. Doyle, Life Insurance in Estate Planning, 22 Ohio St. L.J. 258, 259-60 (1961).
82. Where there is no designated beneficiary at the death of the insured, the insurance
company may have the option of paying the proceeds to certain members of the insurcd's
family. N.Y. Ins. Law § 161 (1) (d). Seemingly, such a provision would lessen the possibility
that the proceeds of the policy would return to the decedent's estate.
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are not enough contingent takers, the insured may make use of an exempt
ultimate taker, such as a charity.sm
V. TRANSFER IN CONTEMPLAiTION OF DEATH
The Regulations84 point out that the insurance section of the Code7, is
not exclusive and that the proceeds of life insurance may be includible under
other sections5 6 One such section concerns transactions made "in contempla-
tion of death."' 7
Under section 2035, any interest in property gratuitously transferred "in
contemplation of death" within three years of the transferor's death is in-
cluded in his gross estate.5 s Whether the transfer is in fact "in contemplation
of death" depends upon the principal motive 9 of the transferor at the time
of such transfer.90 If the motivating force is to reduce estate taxes, the trans-
fer is "in contemplation of death.'*'
Any transfer made more than three years before death, regardless of in-
tent, "shall [not] be treated as having been made in contemplation of death.'1 2
It should be noted that there exists a "rebuttable statutory presumption1* 3
that the transfer was made "in contemplation of death'"O if made within three
83. Gresham, Estate Planning Under 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 94 Trusts & Estates
1026 (1955).
84. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(a)(2) (1961).
85. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
S6. See P-H Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. ff 120420 (1964).
87. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035.
S. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2035-1(a) (1961).
S9. Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1946); Lockwood v. United States, 131
F. Supp. 743 (S.D.Y. 1959); Gross v. Rothensies, 65 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
90. "The phrase 'in contemplation of death' . . . does not have reference to that
general expectation of death such as all persons entertain. On the other hand, its meaning
is not restricted to an apprehension that death is imminent or near. A transfer in 'con-
templation of death' is a disposition of property prompted by the thought of death (if]
.... (1) made with the purpose of avoiding death taxes, (2) made as a substitute for a
testamentary disposition of the property, or (3) made for any other motive as:odatcd with
death." 26 C.F.R. § 20.2035(1) (c) (1961). See Estate of Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F2d
367, 369 (3d Cir. 1963); Tait v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 74 F.2d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 1935).
91. Vanderlip v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 329 US. 728
(1946); 26 C.F.R. § 20.2035-1(c) (1961).
92. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(b).
93. P-H Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. 1 120350.
94. There have been provisions taxing transfers made in contemplation of death in each
of the Revenue Acts since 1916, when an estate tax was first imposed. The United States
Supreme Court, in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), declared unconstitutional the
provision in § 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 that transfers made within two years
of decedents death were conclusively presumed to have been made in contemplation of
death. Section 303(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932 restored the rebuttable presumption.
The language used by the present Regulations is that any transfer made within such three
year period "is deemed to have been made 'in contemplation of death', unless shown to
the contrary." 26 C.F.R. § 20.2035-1(d) (1961).
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years prior to death, thus placing the burden of coming forward with rebuttal
evidence on the estate.
A. Assignment of the Policy
Any transfer made more than three years before death, regardless of in-
tent, "shall [not] be treated as having been made in contemplation of death."0 5
Given such a transfer, the question arises whether group insurance is inherently
includible in the gross estate of the insured. At least one author is of the
opinion that, since group term coverage is usually of a one year nature, the
assignment would have to be annually renewed, and, hence, the assignment
would always come within the three year restriction.00
Term insurance has been defined as insurance which will pay a benefit for
only a stipulated period of time.07 At the end of the agreed term, a new con-
tract of insurance would be required to continue the coverage. It is submitted
that group insurance has been incorrectly categorized as term insurance.
In Frey v. Feller,98 the insured employee irrevocably designated the plain-
tiff as beneficiary under a policy issued by the Travelers Insurance Company.
The employer terminated its contract with Travelers and entered into a new
group contract with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.9 The employee
filed a change of beneficiary request under the new contract.100 The court,
in holding for the newly designated beneficiary, stated that
the insurance was ... term insurance of one year duration renewable each year.
The premium paid for no more than the coverage afforded for the one year period. At
the end of the year the only interest which remained to the Employee or the
Company [employer] was the right to renew, upon a premium which could be
newly computed.1 1
It appears that the court was correct in its decision, but for the wrong reason.
With the substitution of insurers, there was a cancellation of the Travelers
contract, thus terminating all of the plaintiff's rights as an irrevocable bene-
ficiary. The court, however, overlooked this fact and also the fact that a
group insurance contract had previously been held not to be of a one year
renewable nature.10 2 Rather, it is a continuing contract conditioned upon the
payment of the yearly adjusted premium and upon the maintenance of a
minimum number of employees in the group.10 3 Excluding the latter, it would
95. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(b).
96. McCarthy, Personal Life Insurance: Transfers of Ownership of Life Policies; Appli-
cation of Federal Tax Liens to Life Insurance, N.Y.U. 18th Inst. on Fed. Tax 435, 443
(1960).
97. Doty v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 192, 203, 165 S.W.2d 862, 869 (1942).
98. 127 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
99. Id. at 304.
100. Ibid.
101. Id. at 305.
102. Mulligan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 App. Div. 764, 113 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1st Dep't),
reversing mem. 113 N.Y.S.2d 77 (App. T. 1952) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 805,
118 N.E.2d 820 (1954).
103. "[T]here was created a conditional but indeterminate contract of insurance for
life [and] .... this is true for the reason that ... the employer, just as in any other policy
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seem that group insurance, covering an employee during the period of employ-
ment, differs from individual insurance only in that the amount of premiums
is subject to change reflecting the group's prior history. Consequently, both in-
dividual and group insurance are continuing contracts with the condition
precedent of the payment of the established premium.
In Mzdligan v. Travelers Ins. Co.,104 the plaintiff attempted to apply Sec-
tion 161 of the New York Insurance Law to a master policy issued in 1931.13
The policy provided that, if the beneficiary died before payment of the pro-
ceeds to him, the proceeds would become payable to a blood relative. Sec-
tion 161, which took effect on January 1, 1940, provided that the proceeds
would be payable to the designated beneficiary. The insured died in 1945
and the beneficiary died in 1946, before a disbursement of the proceeds had
been made. 10 The appellate term held that the statute was binding on the
policy, thus giving section 161 an apparent retroactive effect. The inference
is that the court considered the master policy to be of a renewable term
nature and, therefore, section 161 became applicable to the master policy
as of its yearly renewable date in 1940.
In reversing, the appellate division' 0 made specific reference to the dissent
of Justice Hofstadter of the appellate term" 'M who, maintaining that section
161 was not applicable to the 1931 policy, stated: "Nor is the master policy
a new policy issued annually because renewed each year by payment of an
adjusted premium."'I 9
The court of appeals, in affirming, did not alter the established law of New
York that a group policy is a continuing contract."" As early as 1925, it had
been decided that, "although the [group] policy is renewable from year to
year, the original policy is continued in force by the payment of the pre-
miums."I" Therefore, an absolute assignment of a group policy does not re-
quire a yearly renewal of the transfer and is not made "in contemplation of
death" if three years have elapsed since the assignment.
B. Payment of Premiums
Despite the fact that it is made more than three years prior to death, the
transfer may still have to hurdle the "contemplation of death" obstacle if
the insured continues to pay premiums after assignment. Generally, the pre-
of life insurance, was clothed with the absolute right to maintain the insurance from
year to year upon payment by it of the rates as annually fied by the insurance company."
Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 759, 762, 134 S.E. 392, 394 (1936).
104. 2S0 App. Div. 764, 113 N.Y.S.2d 659 (ist Dep't), reversing mem. 113 N.Y.S2d 77
(App. T. 1952) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. SOS, 113 N.E.2d 320 (1954).
105. 113 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (dissenting opinion).
106. Id. at 79-SO (dissenting opinion).
107. 2S0 App. Div. 764, 113 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1st Dep't 1952) (memorandum decision).
103. Ibid.
109. 113 N.Y.S.2d at S0 (dissenting opinion).
110. 306 N.Y. 805, 113 N.E.2d S20 (1954) (memorandum decision).
ill. In the Matter of Estate of Johnson, 124 Misc. 493, 501, 203 N.Y. Supp. 655, 65S
(Surr. Ct. 1925). Accord, Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wash. 2d 541, 553, 104
P.2d 310, 313 (1940).
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mium payment test was eliminated by the 1954 Code.112 It has been sug-
gested, however, that the test is still applicable since payments made after
assignment and within three years of the decedent's death may be considered
by the Commissioner to have been made "in contemplation of death." 118 If
the payment of premiums by decedent three years after assignment and yet
within three years of death are "in contemplation of death," it is not clear
what amount will be included in the estate. It has been suggested that the
amount included will equal: (a) the amount of the premiums; or (b) the
entire proceeds of the policy; or (c) a proportionate amount of the proceeds
attributable to such premiums."
4
The sole authority for raising this question is Liebmann v. Hassett.115 In
that case, decedent assigned a policy to his wife two years before his death,
thus raising an inference of a transfer "in contemplation of death." Since
the assignee had paid the two premiums during the period between assign-
ment and death, it was held that the face value of the policy less the propor-
tionate amount of the insurance purchased with the two premiums paid by
the assignee was to be included in the gross estate. 10 The first application
of this case would clearly warn that, for three years immediately after an assign-
ment, the transferee should make the premium payments so that, if the assignor
should die within the three year restrictive period, some portion of the pro-
ceeds will be excluded from the gross estate even though the transfer is
deemed to have been made "in contemplation of death." 117
The converse reasoning of the Liebmann case would seem to be authority
for concluding that the Commissioner would attempt to include the propor-
tionate amount of the proceeds purchased by the assignor within three years
of his death." 8
Such premium payments might, however, be subject to a different judicial
opinion. In Estate of Achille F. Israel,"09 the decedent established an unfunded
insurance trust into which he paid all the premiums until his death in 1939.
The Commissioner attempted to include the premiums paid by the deceased
in the gross estate as payments made "in contemplation of death," but the
court rejected this theory, stating:
We conclude that in paying the premiums here involved, the decedent was actuated
solely by the intention of preserving the integrity of the trust corpus, and not by
112. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
113. E.g., Brown & Sherman, Payment of Premiums as Transfers in Contemplation of
Death, 101 Trusts & Estates 790 (1962). See Gresham, supra note 83.
114. Moses, Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts Can Be Attractive Estate Planning Tool,
18 J. Taxation 206, 211 (1963).
115. 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
116. Id. at 251.
117. Casner, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Estate Planning, 68 Harv. L. Rev.
222, 255 (1954).
118. Casner, supra note 117, at 255; Dicus, supra note 77, at 941-42; Mannhelmer,
Wheeler & Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the Insured, N.Y.U. 13th Inst. on Fed.
Tax 247, 260 (1955).
119. 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1301 (1944).
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any intention or purpose to make such payments as transfers 'in contemplation of
death' ....120
Therefore, whatever else may be included in the gross estate, the premiums
themselves will not be.
In Allen v. Trust Co.,121 decedent established two trusts in 1925 to which
he assigned property. Learning that the assignment was subject to estate tax
because of his power to amend, he released this reserved power in 1937, two
years prior to his death. The Supreme Court refused to include the trust
in the gross estate, stating that the release in 1937 was merely to perfect
the transfer made in 1925.122 Thus, the inference that the release within three
years of death was made "in contemplation of death" was rebutted by a find-
ing that the primary motivation of the setflor was to perfect the prior transfer.
Analogously, premium payments within three years of death should also be
regarded as relating to, and perfecting the prior assignment of, the insurance
policy. It would also seem inconsistent and unfounded to say that the propor-
tionate amount of the proceeds are taxable when the cntire proceeds are not
taxable.
It has been suggested, however, that the use of a funded trust would render
the payment of premiums question moot.'m 'Where there is a contributory
group plan or where the group policy has been converted, the premiums
would be paid by income-producing property assigned to the trust at the
time of the assignment of the insurance policies. Three years after such dual
assignment, neither the policies nor the income-producing property would be
within the purview of the "contemplation of death" statute.
In the event that the group policies are not contributory, the use of a funded
trust prior to conversion would also be beneficial. With the simultaneous assign-
ment of the policies and property to the trust, and with the ever present possi-
bility that the conversion privilege will be exercised and hence will necessitate
the payment of premiums at some date in the future, at least some part, if not
the entire three year statutory presumptive period, would have elapsed, thus
rendering both the income-producing property and the policies themselves
transferred not "in contemplation of death." Therefore, at the time of con-
version, section 2035 would have no applicability. In addition, another con-
sequence of the use of the funded trust would be that the proceeds would also
be excluded from the wife's estate since she would have neither incidents of
ownership nor the ability to transfer any of them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Before an attempt is made to assign a group policy, there are a number
of considerations to be weighed regarding the advisability and feasibility of
assigning any insurance policy. These include, but are not limited to: the
120. Id. at 1307. See Estate of Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963);
Liebmann v. Bassett, 14S F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945); Estate of Wilbur B. Ruthrauff, 9 T.C.
41S (1947).
121. 326 U.S. 630 (1946).
122. Id. at 633.
123. Moses, supra note 114, at 211.
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